The US Navy’s ambitious Ford-class supercarriers, which were supposed to usher in new and unparalleled capability for the fleet, are facing a host of technical and operational setbacks. That is irrespective of the commitment by the Navy-which was underlined when it awarded Huntington Ingalls a $15 billion contract in February 2019 to build the third and fourth Ford-class carriers.
Meeting the Navy’s goal of a 12-carrier fleet would be ambitious, but under the worst-case scenario, that target may stretch into the 2060s. The urgency to take these ships is masking some persistent design issues that have dogged the program. A Congressional Research Service report from February 2019 noted that the program was not only behind schedule but also over budget. Thus far, several of the key systems installed on these carriers have proved unreliable, hence raising questions about the operability of these ships.
The lead ship, USS Ford (CVN-78), which was commissioned in 2017, may deploy as early as 2022. The future USS Enterprise (CVN-79) is on pace to commission in 2024. But the costs are astronomically high: $13 billion for the CVN-78 and $11 billion for the CVN-80. The two-ship contract for CVN-80 CVN-81 is expected to be commissioned in 2027 and 2030 respectively designed to save billions through economies of scale. Still, overall program costs have climbed significantly, with procurement costs for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 each growing 23.6%, 23.4%, and 17.6% respectively since the FY2008 budget submission.
One of those is the Electromagnetic Launch System, or EMALS, which was to replace older steam-powered catapults. After 747 shipboard launches, EMALS has suffered 10 critical failures, a long way from the 4,166 mean cycles between operational mission failures required. But worse is the fact that the inability to isolate EMALS from the shipwide electrical grid complicates its maintenance, to the degree that the ship might have to shut down in combat operations while repairs are carried out.
Similarly, the AAG-which works to land aircraft has also demonstrated problems with reliability. Out of 763 attempts at shipboard landings, AAG has had 10 operational mission failures, far below the requirement of 16,500 mean cycles between operational mission failures. Like EMALS, integrating AAG into the shipwide electrical grid inhibits its maintenance during flight operations.
DBR has also faced its own set of challenges, including performance impacts due to extraneous false and close-in dual tracks. Deploying in a combat environment without electronic protection capabilities creates an unjustified high-risk scenario regarding the certification of the carrier air traffic control center.
The Navy has decided to fit a less expensive primary radar to the CVN-79 and cancel additional capabilities, such as other features and systems to reduce cost. This method dulls the cost, but the consequence likely will be the ship is less capable than the original CVN-78.
The Ford Class is too far down the line, having four carriers either commissioned, in building, or under contract, to cancel. However, the continuing lead-ship problems indicate program-wide costs are likely to continue to climb, and schedules further slip. As RAND recommended in 2017, the Navy did consider smaller carrier studies; this showed that while smaller carriers would indeed be cheaper, they would also be less survivable in combat. RAND offered that a less-capable variant of the Ford class might ease the acquisition burden:
The Ford-class carriers are, in many ways, a case study were the early models of the F-35-in the risks of design choices that are overly ambitious. By focusing on high-risk, high-technology programs instead of lower-risk, higher-cost alternatives, the Navy has developed a fleet that may never achieve its full potential. Overcoming these issues will determine the future of the U.S. Navy’s fleet of carriers, and whether the next generation of carriers will be able to meet operational demands.