During the latter years of the Cold War, the U.S. military conducted a very surreptitious operation involving the purchase of 21 Soviet-manufactured MiG-29 fighter jets from Moldova. The basis behind this was to prevent the advanced planes from getting into the possession of Iran, an event that would seriously destabilize the Middle East region.
These MiG-29s were shipped to Dayton, Ohio, in 1997, where they became a valuable asset for the U.S. Air Force. American and Israeli pilots took these aircraft through extensive exercises and exposed their considerable dogfighting abilities, especially those awarded by their advanced helmet-mounted targeting systems. This was intelligence gold, as it helped the U.S. continue to improve its fighter technologies and prepare for possible engagement with Russian aircraft in future combat.
Equipped with state-of-the-art Soviet technology, it proved equal and even outclassed in some aspects by its American counterparts, the F-15 and F-16 fighters. As one American test pilot related, the MiG-29 was a phenomenal performer, particularly in the hands of a skilled pilot. The thrust was simply phenomenal. On top of all these, their helmet-mounted cueing system allowed precise targeting well out of the realm of American systems at extremely extended angles.
Following the fall of the USSR, Moldova, a tiny country next door to Russia, became the accidental owner of a collection of 34 MiG-29s and eight Mi-8 Hip Soviet helicopters. Unable to maintain such a sizeable arsenal, the risk was that Moldova might sell these planes to Iran, which had been in pursuit of nuclear capabilities since the 1980s. To prevent such a possibility, the U.S. bought the bulk of such warplanes and secretly flew them back to the United States.
These MiG-29 acquisitions gave much-needed insight into Soviet aviation technology. That was particularly valuable during a time when Russo-American relations crumbled to an all-time low since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. For American pilots, understanding the capability and training of Russian pilots could become vital in possible future conflicts.
The Israelis were also given access to the MiG-29s – presumably, by grave concern that Iran might eventually obtain them. As had the American pilots before them, the Israeli pilots found the MiG-29 well worthy of their dogfighting skills. Its advanced targeting system was more capable than anything in the American or Israeli arsenals at the time.
With those MiG-29s, it was the job of the U.S. Air Force’s exploitation units to experiment in search of useful foreign technologies that could be reverse-engineered. The effort probably helped in enhancing the targeting systems of American warplanes to make sure U.S. pilots flying their missions had nothing but the best available.
The secret procurement of the MiG-29s at the end of the Cold War was an audacious and brilliant operation; it gave valuable insight into Soviet aviation technology to the U.S. Air Force and helped perfect technologies now indispensable to U.S. pilots in combat.