The continuing conflict in Ukraine has more recently, especially, affected the military posture of Russia vis-à-vis the Arctic and the Black Sea. Part of the assets of the Northern Fleet, arguably one of the most important elements within Russia’s naval power, has been shifted to other theatres of war. Early in the war, many Northern Fleet naval assets were redeployed either to the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, or directly to Ukraine. All these ships were able to carry approximately 30 tanks and 1,000 troops and were likely transporting assets that did not belong to the Northern Fleet originally.
None of these movements have been followed by reports of the destruction of warships or submarines of the Northern Fleet in combat. Marshal Ustinov returned to the Arctic last summer, at least one of the landing ships appeared in the region as recently as September, and there are no credible reports of the destruction of air combat capabilities associated with the Northern Fleet.
The ground forces have not fared as well. Among the units to see fighting are the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, the 61st Independent Naval Brigade, the 80th Arctic Motor Rifle Brigade, and the 76th Guards Air Assault Division. Most notably, there have been reports of a battalion tactical group from the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade being annihilated, with an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky claiming 645 out of 648 soldiers had been killed. There are confirmations that up to 18 of the T-80BVM variants operated by the 200th have been destroyed. There is also a possibility that the Special Underwater Forces Unit 69068 may have become ineffective due to their training in reconnaissance and sabotage missions.
Sanctions and export controls have further exacerbated Russia’s military capabilities. Several new assets were planned for the Northern Fleet such as another Borei-class SSBN, three Akula SSNs, three more Severodvinsk SSGNs, and next-generation Lada-class SSKs. The ambitious Lider-class destroyer project was aspiring to build eight advanced vessels but the funding problems were issued, and its current status is in a grey area. Aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is in dock for repair; new icebreakers and Arctic patrol vessels are also planned.
These sanctions hit the Russian economy very strongly, as imports from sanctioning countries fell by 50 percent or more compared with the same period in 2021. The Russian economy proved resilient in some ways, souring goods from non-sanctioning countries and ramping up oil purchases by countries such as India. All the same, the defense sector of the Russian economy is in trouble. While defense spending is up, the production of high-tech capabilities is constrained both by export controls and brain drain. For example, Russia’s largest armored vehicle manufacturer stopped making tanks because of the lack of certain foreign parts; even parts of Russia’s military tactical communication system are dependent on components from the West.
Among those specific to the Arctic theater, Ukrainian forces found that a captured Pantsir air defense system operating at major bases in the region held five U.S.-made chips. Precision-guided munitions from the Kalibr, Iskander-M, Kh-101, and 9M727 cruise missiles similarly use Western components. Devoid of both advanced and imported chips, Russia may struggle to rebuild its stockpile of guided missiles and could even see potential competition between missile needs in the Arctic and other theaters like Ukraine.
All in all, these factors have drained and weakened the conventional land forces that Russia has maintained in the Kola Peninsula, reducing its capability for rapid conventional incursions onto the sovereign territory of any of its western neighbors in the Arctic. The naval components of the Northern Fleet-very much its strategic submarine continue to offer a clear second-strike capability, with the prospect of taking out massive sections of North America in a doomsday scenario. At the same time, though, the impact of sanctions on the Russian defense industry may make precision munitions more difficult to come by, thus impairing offensive measures against Arctic NATO allies.
Meanwhile, Russia’s own Black Sea Fleet is beset by other issues: the loss of the huge floating dry dock FD-50 off Murmansk five years ago has proved a crippling blow, while now a barrage of cruise missiles, reportedly provided by Britain, has struck the Sevmorzavod repair facility in Sevastopol, damaging at least two ships in for repair, among them a submarine, thereby likely bringing Black Sea naval capabilities to a grinding halt for many years to come.
According to experts, in the big picture, the particular strike will impact Black Sea Fleet operations, but the greater effect is the tendency to break down the ability of Russia to control the Black Sea. It seems that only cosmetic damage has been inflicted on the docks themselves while clearing the debris is going to be a massive task. What the attack shows is the vulnerability of the Russian vessels in port and the state of difficulty in carrying out repairs when the dry docks get struck.
In support, the capability of self-defense for the Russian Black Sea Fleet declines steadily, as evidenced by the announcement of the Ukrainian military intelligence agency regarding recapturing offshore oil-and-gas-drilling platforms previously employed by the forces of Russia. A very real risk exists that Ukrainian strikes will make it even more difficult to resolve the maintenance problems in the future, leaving the ships and submarines of Russia increasingly vulnerable to these high-explosive attacks.
It is, therefore, feasible to conclude from the cumulative effect of the war in Ukraine and ensuing international sanctions that Russia’s military strength has been significantly degraded both in the Arctic and the Black Sea. While strategic assets of the Northern Fleet remain relatively intact, land forces are depleted. The situation regarding the maintenance and repair of ships in the Black Sea Fleet remains unresolved, which continues to undermine Russia’s naval preeminence in the region.