The British Royal Navy has been into this ambitious undertaking of restoring its former glory over the seas by building two state-of-the-art aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales. From conception into fruition, these carriers were to symbolize the resurgence of Britain as a military power but have become the epitome of strategic and financial overreach for the nation.
Funding problems, maintenance headaches, and a general lack of adequate support ships have chronically plagued the Royal Navy. Critics say that Britain, now a middle power, should have invested in more pragmatic maritime capabilities such as submarines and amphibious warships, capable of countering regional aggressors, mainly Russia. To some, this investment in carriers is nothing more than a vanity project that has become a drain on money that could be used towards more genuine needs in defense.
This is a reflection of the post-imperial trajectory that has taken place with Britain, whereby even in the days of Lady Margaret Thatcher, there was an attempted resurgence of national pride and military greatness. But even with the victory in the Falklands War, those days as a dominant world power were very long over. It was to rekindle such lost prestige that the HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales were built, but the financial and operational burdens have simply become overwhelming.
The fact that the Royal Navy has spent $8 billion acquiring these carriers and has not been in a position to fully fund the required aircraft and support ships has been a stark pointer to budgetary constraints. If that were not all, the decision to cut the amphibious assault ship HMS Ocean to fund the carriers underlines the strategic missteps. The inability of the carriers to conduct the amphibious operations for which they had been built has further been a cause for criticism.
The HMS Queen Elizabeth has been plagued by a series of setbacks, including a fire in its living quarters and malfunctioning engines, which nicknamed it the “cursed” carrier. Events have shown this to be an indication of the larger problem of the overreach of the Royal Navy beyond what it will be able to sustain. Certainly, the economic constraints that Britain faces at the moment will not support such lofty endeavors and risk compromising more practical and necessary defense undertakings.
This strategic misalignment is evident in the Royal Navy’s focus on a capability to project power over great distances ability with which Britain has little need. Instead, the country should be putting its efforts into developing much more regional capabilities, not least given the proximity to Russia. It would be far better value for money to build up the submarine fleet and other practical systems.
The situation in the Middle East further illustrates strains on the naval forces. Ongoing conflict in the Red Sea, and the possibility of escalation in the Eastern Mediterranean, have tested the ability of the US and its allies to respond. The withdrawal of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower from the Red Sea, and the rotation of European naval forces, reflect the further stretched capability of Western navies.
Therefore, the Royal Navy’s presence in these theaters is limited; HMS Diamond has returned home, and HMS Duncan has been redeployed into the Mediterranean. This result of too few destroyers and frigates means that the Royal Navy cannot maintain a presence for some reasons, partly due to the legacy of previous funding cuts and delays in acquisition programs.
The geopolitical evolution means that strategic priorities must now be reordered in the Royal Navy, which needs to find the acceptance of middle power status and anchor that status in practical maritime capabilities for its relevance and effectiveness amidst a rapidly expanding complexity.