Sleek, agile, and tipped to become a major world military aviation player, the Northrop F-20 Tigershark fighter was a hugely improved variant of the F-5 series, specifically designed to fill requirements for several U.S. allies not cleared to buy the more advanced F-16. Rightly expected to lead to full-scale production, this machine never did, due to shifting U.S. export policies and changes in market dynamics.
The F-20 Tigershark was a product of the Fighter eXport (FX) program solicited by the Carter Administration in 1977. FX was a program to offer less advanced, but still potent, fighters that U.S. allies could operate against Soviet-built opposition without actually handing over sensitive U.S. technology. The F-20, initially designated F-5G, was Northrop’s response to this requirement. It had a single General Electric F404 powerplant that provided 60 percent more thrust than the twin engines of its predecessor, the F-5E Tiger II.
Strict requirements of the FX program were spelled out for the new fighter: It would have to fly better than an F-5E but no better than an F-16A, it would have been optimized for air-to-air combat with limited strike capabilities, and the aircraft would be easier to maintain and deploy. These criteria defined a second-tier fighter—a plane designed more for air defense than offensive operations—something like the F-20.
Despite these limitations, the technical characteristics of the F-20 were quite impressive. The aircraft could reach a maximum speed of Mach 2.0 and a ceiling above 55,000 feet. State-of-the-art avionics would include the General Electric AN/APG-67 multi-mode radar for a fighter aircraft in the eighties. Such an aircraft could carry quite a good range of weapons, like Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles. Its cockpit is ultra-modern, complete with a head-up display and multifunction displays.
Test pilot Paul Metz of Lockheed claimed that the F-20 was a matchless blend of state-of-the-art avionics with unsurpassed reliability. He wrote that it was easy to fly and easy to operate, a heritage from the F-5 family. But Metz also conceded that the F-20’s market potential was seriously eroded when the Reagan Administration authorized the export of front-line fighters such as the F-16 to traditional FX countries like Pakistan, Egypt, and South Korea.
Geopolitics also conspired against the F-20’s development. Taiwan was one of the main target customers; however, the sale of the F-20 to the Taiwanese was blocked by U.S. diplomacy in its effort to mend relations with the People’s Republic of China. This compelled Taiwan to develop its light fighter, the AIDC Ching-Kuo.
Even with its technical merits, the F-20 found it hard to hold ground in the market. Northrop lost a sale of the aircraft to the U.S. Air Force as an aggressor trainer, and several other foreign governments were not particularly interested. Such bad luck followed the ill-fated crashes of two prototypes, one killing test pilot Darrell Cornell and the other killing David Barnes.
In a last-ditch effort, Northrop offered the F-20 at a greatly reduced price to the U.S. Air Force. The service had no requirement for the aircraft; hence, the program was finally canceled.
The F-20 Tigershark stands as probably the most interesting “what ifs” in military aviation history. Here was a fighter that promised so much but ultimately fell victim to changing policy and market conditions. As Paul Metz put it succinctly, “The Tigershark project was terminated by Northrop who funded all project costs. It was canceled after the U.S. government changed the standing policy on sales of fighter aircraft to foreign allies.”
The F-20 Tigershark was just a great fighter. It happened to be the right airplane at the wrong time.