The operational efficacy of Russian AFVs is under much scrutiny and criticism by many military experts. A critical analysis unfolds some of the technical as well as tactical dimensions influencing how it performs on the battlefield.
The mission system fit of the Russian tanks is one of the major issues at hand. Generally, fire control computers and sights are less advanced compared to their Western counterparts. Although earlier some progress was made with the import of thermal imagers from Thales and domestic production, allowing for effectively working modernized Russian tanks both at night and in low light, there is much less information on the subject of fire control computers without which just simple work of gun elevation and accurate shooting according to the input of the crew is not possible.
Russian tank designs are notably cramped and have a typical crew of three, as is common with most Soviet designs since the T-64. For Western tanks, a crew of four is common, and performing activities such as replacing tracks, refueling, and maintaining situational awareness would be more laborious with personnel. Specific operating procedures can make up for these disadvantages. Is there a plausible view that would say Russian force design and tactics have, over the history of the service of these tanks, adapted to these technical constraints seeking to duplicate the capabilities of Western tanks?
A deeper aspect of Soviet-era tank design, common right across the complete range of tank models including the T-64, T-72, T-80, and T-90, is the carousel loader for artillery projectiles. This system is located below the turret and consists of 22 rounds of ammunition in two parts-the charge and the projectile. The carousel loader brings the ammunition from the hull up to the gun breech, loading the projectile and then the charge sequentially before returning for the next round. This design allowed the soviet tanks to have a shorter stature and decreased weight, making them more compact while firing full speed and, in some cases, on the move, even though this reduced the accuracy.
Yet all this design brings in some weak points: the carousel loader’s placement in the hull-front is well-protected, but its sides have little armor-the ammunition is placed in such a manner that, if the side or roof of a tank is penetrated, it may reach ammunition and cause a disastrous “cook-off,” whereby the charges and projectiles catch fire. The result is an explosion, which often blows the turret completely clear and kills the crew.
Neither side took any chances: both Russia and Ukraine have already fitted Explosive Reactive Armour (ERA) to close some of those technology gaps. ERA works against weapons such as RPG-7s that make use of high-explosive-anti-tank warheads. Its application on the sides of tanks is of limited advantage because it is hard to apply effective angling of the ERA plates. Well-angled ERA cassettes can at least decrease the penetrative effect of projectiles on Russian vehicles to a small extent, especially in case of firing at an angle. Of course, behind ERA there has to be passive armor, such as RHA, but it is not practicable to add enough passive armor to the sides of a tank to stop advanced anti-tank weapons like the Panzerfaust-3.
Despite all that, evidence from battles such as the one at Grozny has shown T-72 tanks taking multiple RPG and missile hits with no catastrophic explosions. Again, reports from Ukraine have reconfirmed this resilience, suggesting that while vulnerabilities exist, Russian tanks can take a good deal of punishment under certain conditions.
In all, while there are quite a few technical shortcomings and vulnerabilities with Russian AFVs, the design has moved far beyond these simplistic areas of concern, as well as operational tactics. Gaining an understanding of those nuances is key to assessing their performance on the battlefield and how they might adapt in the future.