The Russian flagship is Admiral Kuznetsov; those and the rest of the imposing Kirov-class cruisers have been symbolic of its naval ambitions. But the biggest problems for the Russian Navy are embodied in those vessels, once the pride of the Soviet fleet.
Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft carrier, has routinely been labeled a “national embarrassment,” because of all the never-ending technical problems, accidents, and breakdowns. Commissioned in 1991, the carrier was supposed to project Soviet naval power. Instead, it now symbolizes the decline of Russia’s military capabilities. All of the problems cited above tend to make Russia keep investing in the carrier, perhaps for reasons of national pride and for maintaining operational carrier capabilities. Yet, according to many analysts, the ship is unsalvageable, and Russia’s resources should be invested in a new generation of carriers.
The carrier’s history is one of compromise and limitation. Even its category as a “heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser” was a device to avoid international regulations, in this case, those imposed by Turkey through the Montreux Convention. The Admiral Kuznetsov displaces almost 62,000 tons, making it the largest warship ever constructed in Russia, yet it can meet the conditions of the convention to pass the Turkish Strait.
Its technical limitations as a carrier stare out: The ski-jump flight deck, with its sloping section to assist conventionally launched naval aircraft such as the fighters Su-33 and MiG-29K to take off and land, is highly limiting compared to catapult systems installed on U.S. carriers. The installations required by the U.S. were simply beyond Soviet capabilities at the time and later, Russian financial means.
The reason to keep the aging Kuznetsov might be national pride and fear of a capability gap. Russia is already behind in the pecking order of carrier operations, if Moscow retires the decrepit Admiral Kuznetsov, it might mean a lost generation for its navy. But the carrier has spent most of its time in the shipyard, making one wonder if those capabilities are already lost to Russia. Money might be better spent building a new generation of carriers.
Equally uncertain is the future of Kirov-class cruisers within Russia. These compounds, originally intended to forge opposition to the American aircraft carriers, are now a clouded question as far as their place within the 21st-century Russian navy is concerned. On the issues of feasibility and utility in terms of full modernization, Viktor Litovkin, a military correspondent, shows skepticism. He has noted that the process of modernization of such cruisers cannot be conducted in the establishments of the present-day Russian shipbuilding industry.
It is fully occupied building nuclear submarines, and Zvezdochka does not have a license to work on nuclear reactors in Severodvinsk. Severnaia Verf in St. Petersburg is booked up with the construction of smaller ships, while the Baltic Shipyard, which originally built the Kirov cruisers, is near bankruptcy due to political conflicts. Therefore, the Baltic Shipyard will be the only candidate possible for the modernization of the ships, but also financially very risky.
Litovkin warned long-term construction and renovation projects against corruption. The cases of theft of state funds, regarding the overhaul of Peter the Great and Admiral Kuznetsov, in the last few years, do not help to create trust. He concluded that the only benefit to overhauling the Kirov cruisers would accrue to specific persons, while the Russian navy would gain little advantage from the ships.
Further, the naval struggles Russia has gone through, from the incidents of Admiral Kuznetsov down to the Kirov-class cruisers, pinpoint the bigger challenges besetting the military modernization process of the country. Whilst it is busy toiling with the task of keeping an aging fleet on the surface, the moot question is whether it would be indeed capable of projecting power on the world stage or more saddled with outdated and problem vessels.