An unexpected flash point for the deployment of Dassault’s Rafale fighter jet, it now has the Balkans as a centerpoint of regional military dynamics. Already a NATO member, Croatia has taken delivery of six out of twelve ordered. Regional rival Serbia reports its pending adoption. Greece operates Rafales but is negotiating up to ten more to replace the aging Mirage 2000-5s.
The move is part of a wider modernizing strategy for the Greek air force, in which Athens plans to procure a total of 40 F-35s. Greece’s Hellenic Air Force already retired its Dassault Mirage 2000EG fighter jets and 2000BG trainers in 2021, but the force still maintains twenty-five 2000-5 Mk2s. Plans to modernize those Mirage 2000s were scrapped due to issues of cost and effectiveness.
The Rafale’s popularity doesn’t stop at the Balkans. India and several Middle Eastern countries have also shown their interest in the fighter. Initially conceptualized to serve as an omnirole fighter for replacing seven different types of aircraft, the French military saw in the Rafale a multi-mission aircraft that could address the need of several countries for a replacement of fleets operating American and Russian jets. However, recent orders might overstretch Dassault’s production capacity. The French manufacturer plans to deliver 20 Rafale fighter jets to its clients in 2024 despite the persistent supply chain issues.
Meanwhile, both America and the European Union have drawn up dedicated defense industrial strategies spurred by the war in Ukraine. This war has underlined long production timelines, capability gaps, and value-chain vulnerabilities. Both the US National Defense Industrial Strategy and the European Union Defence Industrial Strategy address two top priorities: building resilience and fostering innovation. Their approaches, however, strongly differ.
While the US strategy focuses on cooperation with allies and partners, the EU pursues a policy of less dependence on US military hardware. The new European Defence Industry Programme covers increasing production of weapons on the continent-a step taken as worryingly received in Washington. The EU is also establishing a Security of Supply regime to build resilience and competitive edge for its defense technology industrial base and supply chains.
Both strategies emphasize building resilience by creating production capacity in areas of current single-source dependence and by exploring further opportunities for reshoring of production of critical materials. Other major emphases include research investment and development in next-generation technology involving innovative defense, including artificial intelligence, hypersonics, and autonomous systems.
At the same time, latent competition between US and EU defense companies, which is deeply rooted in the very concept of transatlantic collaboration, leads to competition between the two sides for a significant stake in the global defense market. Single bids are far more likely to be favored than any collaboration effort. Procurement policies currently in place, such as “Buy American” in the US and EU preference rules in Europe, make cross-border collaboration even more difficult.
US export controls have traditionally been a barrier to technology transfers to allies and partners, affecting European partners because of a lack of reciprocity. At the same time, the EU member states have to work toward harmonizing fragmented national procurement processes to create a level playing field for both their firms and US contractors trying to navigate multinational defense projects.
While industrial cooperation and strategic alignment are not mutually inclusive in the near term, overcoming such obstacles is incumbent upon both the US and the EU as they seek alternative models of procurement that favor cooperation over competition. The simplification of export control procedures and the development of a culture of trust and reciprocity are among the key measures needed to enhance transatlantic cooperation on defense.