The troubles in relations between the United States and Libya had been brewing since the 1960s with accusations of terrorism, running weapons, and espionage. In 1986, tensions reached a boiling point. In January, the United States severed diplomatic ties with Libya. By March, the U.S. Navy retaliated after Libyan forces fired surface-to-air missiles at Navy aircraft. Matters worsened on April 2, 1986, when the U.S. government attributed the killing of four people on TWA flight 840 over Argos, Greece, to Libyan actions. Less than a week later on April 5, 1986, a terrorist bombing at the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin killed one U.S. soldier and injured over 200 people. Therefore, it claimed to have “exact, precise, and irrefutable” evidence of Libyan involvement in the acts; thus, Operation El Dorado Canyon was launched.
Operation El Dorado Canyon was a long-range strike against “terrorist centers” in Libya that the 48th Tactical Fighter Wing in England had well-prepared. Launched on April 14, 1986, the operation launched 24 U.S. Air Force F-111s from Royal Air Force Base Lakenheath, escorted by five EF-111s from Royal Air Force Heyford. These aircraft were to meet severe travel requirements of 3,500 miles each way, necessitating four aerial refuelings due to en-route flight restrictions. As the aircraft approached Libyan airspace, two U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, the USS Coral Sea and the USS America launched 14 A-6E strike aircraft and 12 F/A-18 and A-7 strike support aircraft.
Beginning at 6:54 pm EST, the EF-111s were pouring electronic countermeasures into Libyan air defenses, while Navy support aircraft made SAM suppression a priority. At 7:00 pm, Navy aircraft attacked the Benina Airfield and the Benghazi military barracks; 13 Air Force F-111s hit the Aziziyah barracks in Tripoli and the Sidi Bilal terrorist training camp. Of the number, only four F-111s were able to deliver their bombs correctly against the final strike delivered against the Tripoli military airport. Seven flew off course and failed to hit their targets. Six other aircraft developed mechanical malfunctions or did not drop because of the restrictive rules of engagement.
As the aircraft exited the target area, it was reported that one F-111 was downed. The remaining Navy aircraft returned to their respective carriers as of 7:53 pm. The loss of one aircraft was confirmed during the first return aerial refueling. One overheated engine was routed en route back to England, and one F-111 was routed to Rota, Spain. Search and rescue efforts for the lost F-111 were continued through the morning of April 15 but were terminated that evening without positive results. Both pilots were subsequently confirmed killed.
The raid, although declared a success, was not without controversy. The Navy later maintained that the entire operation could have been accomplished with Navy resources alone. The commander of the 48th TFW believed an original concept of a small group of F-111s had grown too large and lessened the element of surprise, allowing the Libyan defenses to concentrate on the second wave of attackers. Proponents of the larger strike force believed it would cause significantly greater damage to the targets and, thus, was worth the risk. In all, 37 died and 93 were injured in the attack. Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi appeared visibly shaken when, some 24 hours later, he protested the strikes on television. Operation El Dorado Canyon showcased the U.S. Air Force’s long-range precision strike capability, an early demonstration of its Global Reach capability. Shortcomings identified during the operation were remedied, and five years later, the Pave Tack targeting system of the F-111s performed exceptionally well during Operation Desert Storm.
The result of the TFX program was a production variable-sweep wing aircraft, General Dynamics’ F-111. The design enabled it to perform several missions. Its variable-sweep wing permitted the aircraft to perform short takeoffs and landings – with the wings extended – in only 2,000 feet of runway length – and fly supersonic when the wings were swept aft. With its terrain-following radar, the F-111 was capable of flying supersonic, but low, earning its nickname, ‘Aardvark’.
Although the F-111 had its initial setbacks and rejection by the U.S. Navy, it carved out a niche for itself as a low-level bomber for the U.S. Air Force. It played an active role in Operation Desert Storm, flying 19 combat missions and targeting several ground installations in Iraq. The swing-wing design of the F-111 was an inspiration to the likes of the F-14 Tomcat and RAF Tornado, although the advance of aviation technology made this feature redundant eventually.
It was also representative of the military-industrial complex which President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned against, providing jobs and stimulating the U.S. economy despite its high production costs and technical pits. The unique sound of its engines was even included in the Golden Record launched into space, representative of humanity’s technological achievements.
The F-111 was manned by a pilot and a weapons systems officer who controlled the aircraft’s radar and weapons. Unusually, the crew did not wear parachutes, since the aircraft had an escape pod able to eject and safely recover the crew.
Indeed, in 1986, F-111s took part in Operation El Dorado Canyon over Libya’s American interventionist attitude in politics of the world. A controversial action diplomatically, it reaffirmed their resolve to fight terrorism.
The F-111 had served with the 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, based at Upper Heyford in Oxfordshire, before being retired during the mid-1990s. It continued in service in the Royal Australian Air Force into 2010, where it gained the not-too-complimentary nickname of ‘the pig.’ Its final flight was from Upper Heyford to Duxford, where it now stands testimony to its rich history.