There are reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is set to meet with President Putin over the possible provision of weapons to Moscow for ongoing action in Ukraine. The development added to concerns that North Korea may request advanced weapons technology from Russia in return. In active testing, North Korea has included a range of ballistic and cruise missiles, including hypersonic missiles and submarine-launched variants. In April, North Korea conducted the test of a solid-fuel missile, Hwasong-18, which flew around 1,000km on its first flight. The range is estimated to be more than 15,000km. The Hwasong-18 climbed above 6,600km and flew for 74 minutes in its second test launch in July.
Another missile in its arsenal is the Hwasong-12, with an estimated range of 4,500km – capable of reaching the US island of Guam. The ranges of the Hwasong-14 and Hwasong-15 missiles are 8,000km and 13,000km, respectively, and they could theoretically reach continental US soil. In 2022, North Korea conducted a record number of missile tests, including those with the capability to reach US territory. North Korea’s last test of its nuclear bomb was in 2017, wherein the explosion it conducted at its Punggye-ri test site had a yield between 100-370 kilotons. North Korea could be testing a smaller-sized nuclear warhead on a range of missiles, even on short-range missiles.
On other fronts, South Korean naval development continued with the commissioning of the third Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarine, Shin Chaeho, on 5th April 2024; this is the KSS-III program in service with South Korea and provides much-enhanced technology over earlier vessels. The Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines are larger than the KSS-1, with a hull length of 83.5 meters and a displacement of 3,700 tons, enabling operations over distances far larger for longer periods. They have an improved propulsion system that extends submerged endurance up to 20 days; they have been fitted with a vertical launch system firing SLBMs at land targets.
The appearance of SLBM-carrying submarines operated by North Korea has pushed South Korea to develop new capabilities for monitoring and, if necessary, countering such threats. Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines will enable the country to stay hidden off enemy ports for prolonged periods and extend its timescales for tracking and attacking North Korean submarines, should that become necessary. SLBMs would be providing South Korea with a second-strike capability, thereby offering a limited retaliatory capability in the event of a massive attack by North Korea.
Recent comments from Adm. Samuel Paparo, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, have opened the door for the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to South Korea. Paparo had noted that the operational analysis might open up to such an option in the future soft change of course in the U.S. posture about Seoul’s getting its nuclear weapons. The move could offset the growing nuclear menace by North Korea and the rapidly developing naval arsenal of China.
North Korea’s desire for enhanced naval capabilities is the result of a strategic shift towards a general implication in terms of regional security. Traditionally, the KPN has assumed a somewhat subsidiary role in the country’s military strategy; however, recent attempts to expand its naval powers are premised on strategic deterrence, economic and resource security, and geopolitical posturing. The North Korean submarine program, with specific reference to SLBM capability, represents one of the critical components in this development. However substantial hurdles stand in the way of technological capability, economic strain, and international sanctions.
The broader implications for regional and global security are filled by the developments of North Korea’s naval capabilities. Additional actions on the part of North Korean forces could heighten the threat to sea lines of commerce vital to international commerce and could impede diplomatic initiatives aimed at seeking stability on the Korean Peninsula. Proper attention from the international community would also be required concerning the potential risks brought in by such a transformation of North Korea’s military doctrine.