Comparative tests held recently between the F-35A and the A-10C, comparing these two aircraft for close air support, combat search and rescue, and airborne forward air control missions, bring an argument forth in military circles. The tests were conducted from April 2018 to March 2019 and were mandated by Congress through the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act. However, the results, only released after months of pressure from the Project On Government Oversight and heavily redacted, raise more questions than answers over the F-35’s ability to replace the venerable A-10.
According to the report, drafted by the Defense Department’s Office of Test and Evaluation in February 2022, several critical shortcomings of the F-35A were found within the CAS role. Although the Pentagon has attempted to keep the findings secret, the information available still provides less than a flattering picture of F-35 performance. The tests were conducted in “low- and medium-threat environments,” but did not include ground troops, which according to some undermines the conclusions that can be drawn. On the other hand, the report signals a more dynamic and representative environment for a comprehensive assessment.
The A-10C, as many had suspected, “enabled more attacks than the typical loadout of the F-35A.” Much of this was due to the A-10’s larger ammunition capacity and its ability to carry more munitions. Its iconic GAU-8 Avenger 30mm cannon comes loaded with 1,350 rounds, in contrast with the F-35’s GAU-22 25mm gun, which carries only 181 rounds. It also said that A-10 pilots typically flew closer to targets, which enabled them to bomb with a higher degree of accuracy—a critical factor in CAS missions where precision is paramount.
Where the accuracy aspects were concerned, the F-35A did not fare well. More sorties were needed to perform the same mission that an A-10 could do. The report explicitly states that “sorties than A-10C sorties would be necessary to attack the same number of targets,” which links F-35’s lower bomb load with its lower readiness rates, thus strongly opening it up to charges of comparative ineffectiveness. A GAO report from September 2023 disclosed that the full mission capable rate for the F-35 fleet is below 50%, which further problematizes its prospects of replacing the A-10 in CAS roles.
The Air Force had decided to retire 42 A-10s in the next fiscal year despite these findings, since the report has not been widely circulated, deciding on an information vacuum. The decision has been met with critique as, though it had proven its worth in the United States last three major ground wars, it is still able to give close air support in a manner that is reliable and effective.
Advocates for the F-35 concede that it was not made for the high-threat environments that the A-10 can fly in; rather, its stealth and advanced avionics make it more suitable for other missions. However, the report indicates that much improvement remains to be done with this CAS mission for the F-35. Improvements recommended by DOT&E included a fix for the F-35A gun, improving digital communication, video data link, and interoperability with 4th generation aircraft.
Such is the debate continuing between those arguing the F-35’s ability to replace the A-10 and the Air Force itself as it transitions to a future force “inherently close air support-capable”. This retirement comes concurrently with the arrival of the F-35A at bases like Moody Air Force Base in Georgia and the conversion of Gowen Field Air National Guard Base in Idaho’s 124th Fighter Wing to an F-16 mission, two of many shifts across the force. While the F-35 has yet to prove it can replace an A-10, recent tests indicate much work remains.