The recent close air support fly-off between the F-35A Lightning II and the A-10C Thunderbolt II has generated a fair deal of debate among military circles and policymakers. Conducted at Marine Corps Air Station Yuma in Arizona and Naval Air Weapons Station Lake in California, tests were conducted to assess the abilities of these two planes to give efficient support to forces on the ground. However, the test results and their methodology have been riddled with controversies.
The Project On Government Oversight disclosed that the tests, conducted from July 5 to July 12, did not include large-scale Army and Marine ground units. Large-scale participation by these services is omitted in close air support operations. According to POGO’s Dan Grazier, a proper CAS test should involve “large numbers of ground troops in a highly fluid combat simulation in varied terrain, across many days.”
Because of national security considerations, large parts of the report were blacked out, but it’s clear that the F-35A did not perform as well as expected in the A-10’s traditional role. The authors of the report cede that the F-35A has to fly more sorties to hit the same number of targets as the A-10C. Furthermore, the A-10C’s typical loadout supported more engagements than the F-35A’s did, reflecting the A-10’s significantly better ammunition capacity and loiter time over the battlefield.
It was originally designed with a large ammunition capacity and armor protection, carrying up to 16 GBU-39 small-diameter bombs, with the gun system being a 30mm GAU-8 cannon system with an ammunition capacity of 1,350 rounds. Comparatively, the F-35A can only carry eight GBU-39 bombs and has a smaller 25mm cannon system with a capacity of 181 rounds. It also highlighted that the poor gun accuracy of the F-35A further decreases the effectiveness in performing the CAS mission.
The Government Accountability Office also pointed out the low readiness rates of the F-35 fleet, with a full mission capability rate below 50%. A larger concern involves the ability of the F-35 to fly enough sorties, as its overall required sortie rate is much higher than that of the A-10.
Tests also revealed that A-10 pilots were more accurate in hitting targets than their F-35 counterparts. The report explained this, pointing to the fact that A-10 pilots can fly closer to a target because of the aircraft’s armor protection and redundant systems. The F-35 pilots had to rely on stealth, flying higher above targets and avoiding ground fire, impairing bombing accuracy.
Critics argue that the tests were rigged to make the F-35 the winner. POGO discovered that bomb loads for the F-35 had been reduced to improve its maneuverability at low altitudes; the operating ceiling was artificially capped at 10,000 feet, though CAS missions are often conducted at 1,000 feet or lower. High-visibility targets were also used, making them easier for the F-35 to hit despite its worse cockpit visibility than the A-10.
Rep. Martha McSally, a former A-10 pilot, has been an outspoken critic of the F-35 replacing the A-10. She and other A-10 boosters said the F-35 simply can’t wholly replace the A-10’s ground support role. The fly-off findings – still being worked through by the Pentagon’s independent weapons evaluators – will go a long way in determining the future of the A-10 within the Air Force.
The controversy over the F-35 vs. A-10 flyoff underlines the enduring debate on what aircraft would serve best for missions related to close air support. While the results are still being evaluated by the Pentagon and Congress, the future of the A-10 is not certain, also the participation of F-35 in CAS tasks is called into question.