For the DOD, replacing its aging tactical aircraft fleet is remarkably difficult. Today, the military operates a fleet of 15 different types of aircraft, including the Air Force’s A-10 Thunderbolt II and F-16 Fighting Falcon, the Navy’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler, as well as three variants of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Most of them entered service in the 1970s and 1980s. Even against such a pressing modernization need, the Government Accountability Office reported that in December 2022, DOD has not conducted an integrated, portfolio-level analysis across all its tactical aircraft investments. This study would be important in viewing interdependencies, risks, and trade-offs among some of the DOD’s highest-priority and biggest investments. The DOD is making policy changes now to improve its portfolio management practices.
The F-35 program is the centerpiece of the DOD’s future for tactical aircraft. As of March 2023, it has delivered more than 800 aircraft. It is, however, more than a decade behind schedule and $165 billion over original estimates. The system also has a set of challenges: incomplete simulator and associated testing; late deliveries by the contractors; and increasing costs and scope for the Block 4 upgrade effort costing $16.5 billion to address emerging threats. Similarly, the F-35’s engine and thermal management system must be upgraded to improve cooling and extend the life of the engine.
The work in progress of GAO underlines that only 50 percent of aircraft delivered in 2022, that is, the worst result in six years, and more engines delivered late than on time. The GAO outlines that until the DOD verifies its simulator can conduct complex test scenarios replicating real-world conditions, the F-35 will be unable to complete initial operational testing.
Meanwhile, the U.S. The Air Force is hunkering down for yet another budget battle over the retirement of F-22 Raptors and the funding of next-generation fighters in a competition that pits competing priorities of strategic needs against guarantees of air dominance. The GAO faulted the USAF’s fiscal year 2023 budget proposal because it did not include adequate data on the implications of retiring older F-22 Raptor stealth fighters, particularly the Block 20 variant trainers. The USAF operates 32 F-22 Block 20 fighters that are not upgraded to the capability levels of the more advanced Block 30/35 models.
Northrop Grumman estimated upgrading the Block 20 aircraft to the Block 30/35 standard would require a minimum of $3.3 billion and take about 15 years. The USAF judged this information was too limited for its purposes, but sufficient, whereas GAO recommended that the USAF gather more complete information to help make an informed decision based on complete life cycle cost data. The National Defense Authorization Act prevents inventory reductions below current levels until the Secretary of the Air Force submits a detailed report of such a plan to Congress.
The program was once hailed as the future of U.S. air superiority, but budgetary pressures, technological hurdles, and evolving concepts of air dominance raise serious questions about its future. Indeed, the USAF has considered revising the NGAD program as a sixth-generation fighter. The potential cancellation of the NGAD program carries wide-ranging consequences for the U.S. defense industry due to delays by Lockheed Martin in the F-35 program and underwhelming performance in Boeing’s defense segment.
The high costs of NGAD-estimated at $300 million per copy-are high in comparison with parallel investments in the F-35, B-21 Raider, and Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs. Advances in new technologies and drones are prompting a reevaluation of air dominance strategies. Indeed, upgrades would keep the F-22 relevant as an air superiority platform, but most of those upgrades may result in an obsolete fighter upon delivery.
It is reported that an upgrade of the F-22 fleet will be executed over the upcoming decade, well into the $22 billion price range, and may just keep the fighter in service until the 2040s. These would be upgrades to improve the avionics, stealth capability, and overall survivability, meeting various maintenance and operational needs. The F-22s will take a great deal of time and resources that could be spent on building a better fighter.
Heather Penney with the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies said, Extending the life of some legacy aircraft is necessary; they provide essential foundations to combat infrastructure. However, she added, Legacy aircraft are undefendable in contested battlespace, and fifth-generation aircraft should replace them to keep up combat capacity. The alternative that Penney suggests is a clean-sheet fighter design, but this has to be effective in a near-peer conflict and sufficiently affordable to allow recapitalization and high-tempo usage. Any new fighter program would be a very long-term undertaking, so the only practical short-term option is F-35A accelerations, he says.
As the U.S. struggles to ramp up F-35 production, no other real fifth-generation aircraft would stand a chance against the Sino-Russian opposition. Hence, there is a great and urgent need for extending the service life of the F-22 fleet-not without great pitfalls.