The United States Navy has decided to reinstate two Iowa-class battleships in August 1998, namely Iowa and the Wisconsin, BB-61 and BB-64, respectively, onto the Naval Vessel Register, in an extremely controversial move further breathing life into history’s age-old battleship debate. The continuous crusading by zealous, pro-battleship advocates happened on 30 December 1997, taking these fearsome fighting vessels from retirement and raising speculations over the roles they would play in contemporary warfare.
Once the epitome of naval firepower, the Iowa-class battleships had been stricken from the NVR on 12 January 1995 in the face of hard realism over their obsolescence and the exorbitant costs of bringing them out of retirement. However, a hard-core group of battleship fans wouldn’t allow these leviathans to slip into retirement. Their organized campaign culminated in the Senate Armed Services Committee’s 17-3 vote on June 29, 1995, to keep at least two Iowa-class ships in mothballs.
“These warships were the Navy’s ‘only remaining potential source of around-the-clock accurate, high-volume, heavy fire support.” Senate Armed Services Committee report.
While the leadership of the Marine Corps remained relatively mute in their protests against the initial decommissioning and subsequent reinstatement, persistence won out for the battleship proponents in swaying the Navy’s decision. After years of deliberation, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations issued a memo dated 30 December 1997, signed on 21 January 1998, by Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jay Johnson, and on 12 February 1998, by Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, reinstating the Iowa and Wisconsin to the NVR.
The question, however, is what could be the million-dollar reason behind it. The concept of modern naval doctrine envisions amphibious assaults launched over the horizon distances as far as 50 miles offshore, facilitated by MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, helicopters, and air cushion landing craft. This, in conjunction with the requirement for naval gunfire support, makes the 16-inch guns of the Iowa-class battleships relevant again; although capable of firing a projectile 27 miles, they still seem ill-suited to deliver effective fire support without unduly jeopardizing the safety of these high-value assets by bringing them perilously close to shore-based threats.
“These warships were the Navy’s ‘only remaining potential source of around-the-clock accurate, high-volume, heavy fire support.” Senate Armed Services Committee report.
On the horizon already, though, are replacements for the antiquated 16-inch guns: the extended-range guided munition, or ERGM, rounds for the 5-inch/62-caliber gun; the vertical gun for advanced ships, or VGAS, out to 100 nautical miles; and a host of missile systems that offer far greater ranges and payload flexibility.
Moreover, the cost of their reactivation and operation is in itself a huge factor. It is recalled that back in the days when the Reagan administration was building up a 600-ship fleet, reactivating all four Iowa-class ships cost about $1.66 billion. By today’s standards, bringing two back might cost more than $1 billion, which is even more than an Aegis destroyer equipped with a mighty arsenal of 90 missiles.
Compounding the financial burden, a last-minute congressional maneuver may further escalate the reactivation costs. Originally scheduled for retention were the Wisconsin and the New Jersey (BB-62); the Missouri, BB-63, was slated to become a memorial, and the Iowa, because of damage from a 1989 turret explosion, was not considered for service. Legislation pushed through by the New Jersey congressional delegation, however, has forced the Navy to keep the damaged Iowa in service, along with the Wisconsin, and $8 million of repairs to the Iowa’s three-gun 16-inch turret are now planned.
Logistical problems are the least of the challenges. Assuming that shipyard space can be found, it will take over a year to reactivate each ship. The upgrades necessary to bring the battleships’ radars, electronic countermeasures, communications, and other systems into a position where they can deal seamlessly with today’s naval forces are enormous. At the same time, the biggest challenge may well be training an entirely new generation of sailors to man these antique systems, the 16-inch and 5-inch/38.
These needs naturally vary from the 16-inch and 5-inch/38-caliber guns to the Mark 13 fire-control systems, not forgetting the 600-pound steam plants. Each battleship would require a crew of approximately 1,600; therefore, having two of them would set the manning requirement at about 3,500 persons, enough to man about ten modern Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.
“There are no U.S. Navy personnel currently qualified in the 16-inch or 5-inch/38-caliber guns, the Mark 13 fire-control systems, the 600-pound steam plants, or many of the battleship’s other systems.”
Moreover, another six months of at-sea crew training would be required to make these warships combat-ready if activation were to happen, thus postponing their availability to the fleet another 18 months from when ordered.
A final point: stocks of 16-inch barrel liners are very low, a vital component of the battleships’ main armament. There are only a few dozen liners left, enough to sustain training and probably one full-scale firing deployment by two battleships. Additional liners would have to be manufactured at a substantial industrial effort and cost.
Now, the debate rages on as if one wonders what kind of logic the Navy is using to bring back these old leviathans in this modern age of rapidly changing technological warfare. Will bringing back Iowa and Wisconsin support the service’s strategic vision, or is this nothing more than a nostalgic indulgence at the hands of battleship enthusiasts?
Does anybody truly believe the Navy will, at any time in the foreseeable future, even in times of crisis or conflict, commit the time needed, along with the resources required, to bring these two behemoths back into active service?
Only time will tell if this decision will prove to be a prudent use of resources or a misguided attempt to grasp the past. As the Navy sails into the uncharted waters of 21st-century warfare, these resurrected battleships may very well end up serving as a litmus test of sorts regarding the service’s capability to balance tradition with innovation and to adapt to the shifting demands of modern combat.