Admiral Kuznetsov, Russia’s only aircraft carrier, has become an iconic example of its persistent naval woes: constantly suffering mechanical failures, fires, and corruption. It has been notorious for billowing black smoke and frequent breakdowns. The carrier experienced several setbacks concerning all this, particularly in 2011. US Navy officials even once feared it might sink during a Mediterranean deployment sure sign of how precarious the vessel was.
Yet it had been due to retire by the end of the decade, and its ongoing refit-which commenced in 2018-has been afflicted by delays and accidents. The latest estimates suggest that it will not return to service until no sooner than 2024, casting doubt on the carrier’s long-term prospects. It remains a drain on the resources of the fleet, according to a source in the Russian defense sector, while defects in the work are such that the period in dry dock has been protracted.
Things took a turn for the worse last October when the PD-50, a massive floating dry dock at Roslyakovo’s 82nd Repair Shipyard, sank with Admiral Kuznetsov inside for repairs. The dry dock buckled and crushed a large portion of the carrier’s flight deck into the sea, injuring and possibly killing several people. The loss of PD-50 may have ripples throughout the Russian navy, compounding its chronic problems keeping vessels upgraded and maintained.
Russia relies on large Soviet-era surface combatants to field a credible blue-water navy, but chronic problems in producing new naval vessels larger than a frigate have compelled the navy to overhaul and extend the service life of existing older ships. This approach works only insofar as Russia can continue to modernize, renovate, and rehabilitate these platforms.
The underinvestment in repair infrastructure is coming home to roost, and the potential loss of PD-50 reflects this systemic problem. Raising and repairing PD-50 presents huge challenges; early reports indicate it may be lying on its side in 160 feet of water. Even if the dock can be raised, it might take years at great expense to repair it.
This would leave Russia with few options, now, none of them good. The only option still operable is the PD-41 floating dry dock in Fokino near Vladivostok, but moving it to Severomorsk is an awkward geographical proposition as is towing Kuznetsov to Fokino. Another option includes the PD-190 floating dock in Novorossiysk on the Black Sea – though it is questionable whether the Kuznetsov would fit.
The final option for Russia would be fixed dry docks outside its national borders, but post-Crimea sanctions make the Western options unworkable. The STX Europe dry dock in Turku, Finland, is the closest major dry dock that could service Kuznetsov; however, Finland is an E.U. member and sanctioning Russia.
Whether or not the PD-50 is recovered, the accident will be a delay to the modernization of Kuznetsov. It is unclear how much of the remaining work requires that the carrier enter a dry dock, and how much can be done at the pier. It does seem that work on the propulsion system, as well as on the hull and shafts, is going to require further use of a dry dock.
The loss of PD-50 will further affect the rest of the fleet, including surface combatants and submarines. The largest floating dry dock in Russia, PD-50 has been in near-constant use, often servicing several vessels at one time. The modernization programs of the Kirov-class battlecruisers and the submarine fleet may be impacted as other facilities in the region will be forced to take up the slack resulting from PD-50’s loss.
Moscow finds itself between a rock and a hard place. Should it cut its losses with the Kuznetsov modernization or take other options that may well prove problematic? The circumstances of the PD-50 accident may finally make it accept that the prospects for Kuznetsov-and by extension the blue-water fleet-are not good.