Picture yourself on a serene coastline, thinking the worst that could happen is a tsunami. Not so anymore, for on the horizon may be Russia’s new Poseidon torpedo, packing a nuclear punch that could destroy whole coastal cities and spread untold devastation.
In January 2023, the first batch of Poseidon torpedoes was said by the Russian news agency TASS to have been produced in Russia. Nuclear-powered and long-range, nuclear-armed, these torpedoes could raise radioactive floods in coastal cities that would kill millions. Recently, over the past few years, sensational stories on tabloid news show how a 1,000-foot-tall radioactive tsunami sweeps onto British shores, destroying everything along its path and leaving cities lifeless.
In the United States, it is known as Kanyon, Ocean Multipurpose System, and Status-6. First revealed by the Russian Navy in 2015, it was reportedly tested in November 2016. This drone is nuclear-powered, can carry nuclear weapons, and is launched from submarines, designed to operate below the surface of the ocean. On the term sheet, the first Poseidon is forecast to be operational in 2027.
According to nuclear experts, Poseidon gets its propulsion from a compact nuclear reactor that travels at 100 knots, which is equivalent to 185 kilometers per hour, with a range of about 10,000 kilometers at depths of up to 1,000 meters. To avoid acoustic tracking devices, Poseidon has been made with a diameter of about 1.6 to two meters. The payload is devastating, including a nuclear warhead with a yield of approximately several megatons, while earlier reports described it at 100 megatons. As a comparison, the world’s most powerful nuclear weapon ever tested is Russia’s Tsar Bomba, which had an estimated blast yield of 50 megatons.
While some reports have circulated that Poseidon could well turn out to be a propaganda scheme, experts generally agree that the system is “very real” and has been strongly funded by the Russian armed forces. Intelligence reports describe it as undergoing numerous trials, and that submarines have been modified or specially built to accommodate the much larger and heavier torpedo. For example, the Sarov submarine is believed to have been modified to test Poseidon prototypes. According to TASS, the Russian Navy is likely to purchase no less than 30 Poseidon torpedoes and equip four submarines with this armament.
The concept of nuclear-armed torpedoes dates back to the 1950s when the Soviet Union began to develop submarine-launched nuclear torpedoes. During the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, a Soviet submarine armed with a T-5 nuclear-tipped torpedo came close to launching against US forces. The launch was avoided only by the submarine’s deputy commander’s intervention, who convinced other top officers that this would prove to be a fatal mistake.
Unlike the T-5, there won’t be a human onboard the Poseidon torpedo who could conceivably make the right decisions after launch. The post-launch control would have to be done through some combination of remote communications and onboard automation. This raises concerns about hacking, technical malfunctions, and environmentally caused accidents that could lead to inadvertent escalation.
Poseidon marks a new epoch in the nuclear deterrence strategy of Russia. What remains is that Russia already possesses the automated system of command and control for nuclear weapons: the Dead Hand. Known as the Perimeter, it was born in the Cold War with a general aim to ensure that, in the event of a nuclear first strike destroying the Soviet Union’s armed forces and leadership, the Soviet Union would be able to still retaliate. Having been affected by the American advances in ballistic missile defense systems, it no longer holds its prestige at present.
Russian authorities call Poseidon a multi-purpose system, indicating that it could serve several missions. It is largely speculated that Poseidon resulted from the advancement made by the US in ballistic missile defense. Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in March 2018 that Poseidon, along with other advanced weapons, was developed due to the demise of the 1972 US-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. After the U.S. had pulled out from the treaty back in 2002 to work on its new national missile defense system, Russia started the renovation of its military equipment and weapons to ensure a powerful nuclear deterrence capability.
Poseidon is not only touted as a weapon that can bypass US ballistic missile defenses but also represents Russia’s greater nuclear strategy and doctrine. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has considerably downgraded the role that nuclear weapons play in security strategy. Russia continued to have an outsized dependence on nuclear weapons and was heavily investing in a nuclear doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate”: nuclear coercion and messaging techniques for the attainment of strategic ends. New nuclear weapons under development and deployment enhance this broader strategy.
With the development of artificial intelligence and its application to autonomous platforms, there is apprehension that nuclear delivery could have disastrous implications for strategic stability. Nuclear-weapon countries with fewer resources will find it tough to be at par with the development of AI-based technologies leading to reduced direct human control over nuclear weapons employment. In this context, deployment of the Poseidon will endanger strategic stability.
However, many experts and US officials, not to mention former US Defense Secretary James Mattis, are certain that Poseidon would not tilt the existing strategic nuclear balance with the United States. Russia can already launch nuclear-armed missiles against US cities, and the introduction of Poseidon would do little to increase an already formidable threat. Indeed, many view Poseidon largely as a psychological weapon meant for nuclear signaling rather than actual use. Some even believe that Poseidon will never go beyond the prototype stage but rather maintain primarily political purposes, such as reopening negotiations with the United States over ballistic missile defense systems.
Machines like Poseidon complicate decision-making in a crisis and are all but making AI a party during strategic adversity. It has evoked an extremely lively debate on the extent to which these systems should be fully automated, given that automation runs high risks of misjudging the opponent’s intentions. The difficulties posed by such unmanned, automated nuclear vehicles as Poseidon are better understood through further research. While ensuring that research in automation is oriented towards reducing risks of accidental or inadvertent use, it is similarly incumbent on countries to press for arms control and risk reduction talks. It is such dialogues that might be transformative in learning about each other’s nuclear forces, helping to dispel uncertainties about new weapon systems in the making, including Poseidon.