Thus far, the Russia-Ukraine War has only marginally involved the Russian Navy, its participation mainly limited to the Black Sea Fleet and Caspian Flotilla. Russia has nonetheless sustained substantial losses, including a cruiser and several other vessels, out of a total of five cruisers. Those losses, along with the recent accessions of Finland and Sweden to NATO, might be assumed to have resulted in a fundamental reconsideration of Russian naval strategy. However, very little evidence exists to demonstrate that such a reevaluation is underway. Neither, despite the framing of the war by the Kremlin as part of a greater conflict with the West, is there much, if any, evidence that production in Russian shipyards is ramping up to meet wartime requirements.
Consequently, the Moscow naval strategy is still addressed to two central goals: to maintain and improve its forces of nuclear-powered submarines as a means of achieving strategic parity with the United States and to improve its conventional naval forces to be capable of projecting power worldwide. However, the Russian approach is weakened by dissipating limited resources across various fleets, research programs, and shipyards.
In 2022, United Shipbuilding Corporation, a major player in the Russian naval industry, completed the year with a net loss of tens of billions of rubles, reporting record revenue. Delays with a new ship and repaired ship deliveries have troubled the company all year, having managed to deliver only six ships and submarines instead of the eleven planned. The completion date of the modernization work on the nuclear-powered cruiser Admiral Nakhimov has been postponed until 2024. Similarly, the beginning of similar work on the Petr Veliky has also been delayed. In the same vein, the date for finishing the repairs and modernizing Russia’s only aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, has been pushed back to 2024.
From a naval armaments perspective, Russian military political leadership is firmly convinced of the need to increase the number of cruise missiles aboard newly built and improved ships, and even on diesel-electric submarines. Other aspects of the naval development are still discussed, however. The future of Project 677, directed at advanced diesel-electric submarines, is not certain because of technological difficulties with the creation of air-independent power systems. As for the new nuclear-powered missile destroyers and aircraft carriers, their development is also very speculative with no concrete plans ready so far.
Modernization of existing nuclear-powered submarines of Borei- and Yasen-class appears more likely than the development of new generations, taking into account the efforts made to reduce the time of construction. The manufacturing of marine engines remains one of the significant bottlenecks, given that the overall production capability of Russia is no more than two engines a year. Every frigate of the Gorshkov class requires two engines, just as the large landing ships with helicopter carriers do.
Despite these challenges, the submarine force remains a potent constituent of Russian naval power. The country retained the industrial capacity and know-how to make capable submarines; it concentrated its construction efforts on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines-the SSBNs-guided-missile submarines-the SSGNs-and attack submarines-the SSNs. The operational submarine force today is estimated at 12 SSBNs, 8 SSGNs, 11 SSNs, and 20 diesel-electric submarines SSs.
Equipped with Bulava missiles, the Borei-class SSBNs mark the largest development in Russian sea-based deterrent capabilities. Meanwhile, the Yasen-class SSGNs, spearheaded by the Severodvinsk, feature among the most advanced undersea adversaries fielded against the U.S. Navy. Older Oscar II-class SSGNs upgraded with more flexible missiles against the AN increased Russia’s submarine capabilities.
Upgraded Kilo-class submarines represent a mainstay of Russia’s diesel-electric fleet, which is designed to serve both coastal defense and special operations. These submarines remain under construction, with an increased number bound for the Black Sea and Pacific Fleets. However, the failure to develop an effective air-independent propulsion system meant the Lada-class program stalled.
Still, Russia also maintains a small fleet of special-purpose submarines, controlled by the General Directorate of Undersea Research (GUGI), to support a range of activities development of submarine weapons for deep ocean projects, and even to include potentially interdicting sea floor fiber-optic cables-nuclear and diesel-electric submarines alike.
Though only a fraction of the Soviet-era submarine fleet and dwarfed by today’s U.S. submarine force, the Russian submarine fleet remains at the center of Russian naval combat power. The still-unfolding SSBN replacement program and new SSGN/SSN designs will be the underpinning of the underwater military balance deep into the 2030s. Despite economic difficulties, Russia’s submarine force continues to be heavily invested in, ensuring its continued relevance in future naval conflicts.