The art of concealment and deception has become the order of the day in the complex theater of contemporary naval wars. Although the legal regime concerning the definition of a warship is clear, certain states take advantage of technological progress to blur the very definitions. This tendency can be witnessed avidly in key maritime powers that are currently working on complex oceanic surveillance and reconnaissance networks. It is a consequence that has forced navies to develop maritime deception and concealment doctrines that are applicable both during peacetime and wartime operations.
The most recent techniques used by the Russian Navy show how this is put into practice. Since March 2022, warships of the Russian Navy have started painting over their hull numbers and names, thereby getting rid of the international marking of nationality. This is a very common practice around the Black Sea to confuse the identity of vessels: hence, the impossibility of confirming losses if the Ukrainian forces sink one. This stratagem was notably used when, in March 2022, the Ukrainian armed forces claimed to have burned the Vasiliy Bykov. Yet, as Article 29 stipulates, a warship is supposed to bear external marks of its nationality, and without those, it would be unlawful.
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) also uses tactics creating confusion as to the status of some ships. A case in point is that of the port call by Yuan Wang 5 in Sri Lanka in August 2022. Though the ship looks to be a part of the navy, the authorities insist this is a research and survey vessel, not a warship. The ambiguity extends also to the use of maritime militias, as signals of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia. These ships, sometimes referred to as the “little blue men,” are pitted against everyone whose claims to territory oppose and add to the messiness of the maritime security environment.
The other tool in the stratagem of maritime deception is, of course, misuse of the Automatic Identification System (AIS), although AIS is not mandated for warships, they often use it when in safety or operation areas. Still, various navies possess a capacity for AIS spoofing: generating false AIS positions to lie about a ship’s actual location. This was seen in practice in 2021, with the HMS Defender, whose position was spoofed off Russian waters, apparently violating innocent passage rights.
Additional complexity is added by unmanned aerial vehicles. These drones are capable not just of intelligence gathering, but they are capable of conducting a range of other operations with immediate attribution to a navy. However, existing agreements, such as the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas and the Chicago Convention on Civil Aviation, treat UAVs as aircraft and, respectively, under their rules. A UAV flight over a ship involved in ongoing operations could well amount to an internationally cognizable wrongful act implicating state responsibility.
The so-called Russian Shadow Fleet involves old, outdated oil tankers that sail outside of international regulations to avoid sanctions levied because of the war in Ukraine. This fleet, which has grown by more than 50 percent since February 2022, is an enormous environmental and navigational risk. The tankers, usually flagged under flags of convenience, operate surreptitiously through the use of AIS gaps, ship-to-ship transfers, and re-flagging in order not to be detected. Such vessels are not insured under P&I insurance and hence pose a significant ecological threat as they are too old and do not meet safety standards.
Activities of the so-called Russian Shadow Fleet go far beyond simple conveyance of oil and can perhaps include arms transport, military intelligence, and other clandestine operations. Their presence is a serious threat to the security of navigation and maritime stability, acting in mannerless defiance of legislation and conventions and menacing world navigation along with the environment.