In the chronicle of armor history, MBT-70 stands to be reckoned as a bold innovation that self-destroyed from its myriad complexities. Conceived during the 1960s as a collaborative development with the United States and West Germany, MBT-70 was supposed to be a behemoth of a main battle tank to outrank Soviet armor. Despite all this, the promising MBT-70 design never saw deployment beyond the prototype stage. Here’s why.
The 1960s was the time when the West German Leopard I and the American M60 were considered superior tanks in most respects, having good mobility, firepower, and acceptable armor. However, the 1973 Yom Kippur War later exposed these same tanks to at least two weaknesses, primarily against Soviet anti-tank missiles. It was noted that while the Israeli M60s did well against the older Soviet T-54s and T-55s, they were still quite vulnerable to new anti-tank technology. This eventually resulted in the joint U.S.-West German development of a new MBT, capable of surviving against such threats.
The MBT-70 was a ground-up design—not an incremental improvement on existing models. It sported a hydropneumatic suspension system, similar to today’s South Korean K2 Black Panther, that permitted the tank to lower or raise its stance to achieve improved firing angles and handling. Its 152-millimeter cannon would be paired with new anti-tank missiles and conventional HE rounds for a huge range advantage.
It also had good mobility, outperforming the Leopard I, the M60, and all Warsaw Pact armor in top speed and acceleration. Its advanced suspension also made it easier and more comfortable for the crew when operating at faster speeds. The armor on the MBT-70 was a specially designed steel blend capable of defeating 105-millimeter rounds at close range, and it included a plastic polyethylene layer for radiation protection. It could also filter radioactive particles and chemical agents from the air.
Despite all the impressive specifications, the MBT-70 was plagued with problems. Initially, disagreements over measurement units, as the West Germans favored the Metric system and the Americans their own, delayed development at a great cost. The 152-millimeter gun, theoretically having the better advantage, used a new type of caseless ammunition that proved to be troublesome. In addition, smoldering embers left behind by combustible case walls in the barrel could account for the very premature firings in testing. Besides, it was found that rounds were susceptible to moisture, which could make them swell, resulting in their jamming of the gun.
The weight of the tank was also a problem, especially to the West Germans whose rail infrastructure and bridges were not built to support such weights. The squat turret also had problems of its own: drivers sat in a rotating capsule that kept them always facing forward, which can be disorienting when the turret is facing in a different direction.
Ultimately, cost overruns and the drive toward unwarranted complexity killed the MBT-70. It was a decision to install state-of-the-art features, rather than their incremental development, that proved so costly in terms of testing. The projected costs reached fivefold the original estimates, hence an investment untenable.
In the end, West Germany and the United States discontinued MBT-70. Instead, they developed the Leopard II and Abrams M1, respectively, which are still in service with their respective armed forces to this day. The MBT-70, though it never left the prototype stage, really did lead to these successful designs.
The MBT-70 case is an example of how ambitious innovation often miscarries under the heft of its aspiration. However, it showed that at times even failures can contribute to future successes in its later innovative tanks.