A high order of criticism undergirds the Littoral Combat Ship program, and its challenges often overshadow the valuable capabilities brought to the fleet. Despite setbacks, LCS is currently deployed apace and continues to play an important role in filling holes within the fleet under the rubric of distributed lethality. Effort must be transferred into learning how best to maximize its strengths while mitigating its weaknesses.
The 2003 original Concept of Operations envisioned the LCS as a forward-deployed, theater-based component capable of executing anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, and mine warfare missions in littoral zones. This vision is as valid today as when it was first expressed. The Navy needs small surface combatants—now—to replace aging mine countermeasure ships and patrol craft, and to fill gaps left by decommissioned frigates. Until a new plan for small surface combatants is introduced, LCS will fill these widening gaps.
It was also designed for “mobility” missions such as support of special operations forces, maritime interception operations, force protection, humanitarian assistance, logistics, medical support, and noncombatant evacuation operations. Assignment of these missions to LCS frees up multimission destroyers and cruisers to engage in high-end combat operations. For instance, USS Freedom (LCS 1) and USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) have participated in exercises like CARAT in direct support of theater security operations and international partnerships. The forward deployment of the ships to Singapore allowed their rapid response to real-world events, such as humanitarian and disaster response operations for the typhoon in the Philippines and search and rescue operations for AirAsia flight QZ8501.
The larger number of ships on the station enables the execution of distributed lethality for offensive sea control. The qualities that make this possible within distributed lethality are distributing offensive capability geographically, thereby complicating an enemy’s targeting process of our force and holding enemy assets at risk from multiangle perspectives. Upgunned LCS—with over-the-horizon missiles and an improved electronic warfare suite and countermeasure systems—can be a greater, rather than smaller, offensive and defensive threat.
LCS already embarks on the MH-60R helicopter and the MQ-8B FireScout unmanned autonomous system to provide air elements in support of antisubmarine and surface warfare missions. Surface ship antisubmarine warfare capabilities are significant and growing, with future sonar suites and surface-to-surface missiles. Mine warfare module will present LCS with a full spectrum mine warfare capability that will replace the aging Avenger-class MCMs.
The lightweight and small size of LCS also have tactical applications within tonnage limits for foreign warships, such as in the Black Sea. Its draft of about 14-15 feet will enable easier operations compared to larger destroyers in the littoral zones. This will further improve the performance of LCS in the Arabian Gulf and the Pacific.
Designed as part of a “dispersed, netted, and operationally agile fleet,” LCS is precisely what the Navy needs today to build operational distributed lethality for sea control. Resolving existing engineering concerns will only serve to enable the potential promise of the LCS program. Continued congressional and Navy leadership funding and support are critical to ensure proper manning, training, and equipping of the LCS fleet.